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THE CONSTITUTION AT WORK
Congressman Alan Nunnelee*
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2010, the winds of change blew across America. The
country only two years prior had swept Barack Obama into the White
House and had put significant Democrat majorities in the Senate (59-D, 41-
R, 1-I) and the House of Representatives (257-D, 178-R). In 2010, Ameri-
cans had become frustrated with the direction Washington was leading
their country. Issues such as the passage of national health care, govern-
ment stimulus, and a mounting national debt motivated citizen involvement
as evidenced by the TEA Party movement.
The Republicans gained 63 new seats in the House of Representatives,
giving the GOP a 242-193 majority and the opportunity to elect John Boeh-
ner from Ohio as Speaker of the House. This new majority was bolstered
by the 87-member freshman Republicans, the largest group of Republican
freshmen in our nation's history. In the Senate, the Republicans gained six
seats, but the Democrats maintained a 53-47 majority. The result has been
a divided 112th Congress and gridlock.
The founders of this nation envisioned a government whose authority,
and legitimacy, is granted from the people. A true constitutional republic
consists of more than free elections and the peaceful transition of power-
it begins with "we the people." It occurs when people from diverging back-
grounds, experiences, social classes, economic viewpoints, and political phi-
losophies come together to form a government where, even though every
view may not become law, every voice is heard.
II. A FALSE START
As the Philadelphia Convention began, delegates from across the
country could at least agree on one thing-the Articles of Confederation
had undoubtedly failed. Its constitutional defects had nearly crippled the
fledging American government. By failing to establish an executive
branch, forgoing the creation of a national court system, and stripping Con-
gress of the power to regulate both interstate and international commerce,
the Articles left the national government weak, ineffective, and subject to
the competing demands of the states.'
Particularly troublesome was the legislature. Under the Articles,
states could send between two and seven delegates to the single-chamber
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Congress, though each state had only one vote.2 Accordingly, each piece
of legislation required delegates to decide amongst themselves just how
they would vote.' Though intended to promote state equality, the "one
state, one vote" system actually undermined national unity and strength-
ened localism; delegates from the most populated states were often left to
wonder why the smallest among them held equal political power.'
The passage of legislation also proved difficult. Most matters required
only a simple majority vote for approval, though a number of important
issues-including those of war, peace, and the expenditure of funds to sup-
port the army-required agreement by nine states.5 Yet no state could
vote on the floor of Congress unless at least two delegates were present.6
Frequently, the difficulties of travel, illness, and weather left a state without
the minimum representation needed to vote.7 Congress often found itself
unable to pass any legislation over these matters, given the absence of too
many voting delegations.' Business stalled.
Amendments to overcome these handicaps proved impossible. A sin-
gle state had veto power over any proposal.9 With this stringent require-
ment of unanimity, the Articles of Confederation were never able to find
the support necessary to affect needed structural changes.' 0 A recasting of
the American government seemed to provide the only solution.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The Philadelphia Convention immediately set to work on reconfigur-
ing the government, and the eventual Constitution found a healthy audi-
ence of both supporters and detractors. Debates over the new
Constitution's ratification provide the clearest illustrations of the conflict-
ing political theories of the era. Advocates of the Convention's brainchild
quickly organized and adopted the label of "federalists."" Those in oppo-
sition became known as "antifederalists."12
Notably, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay became
the most ardent of federalists." For these, the proposed Constitution rem-
edied the clear defects of the Articles, shifting power away from the states
into a central, federal government, compelling them to accept national
laws.1 4 Although antifederalists agreed in principle with the need for a na-
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believing that only strong state governments could protect individual liber-
ties against the tyranny of a central authority."
For antifederalists, the shadow of the English monarchy loomed
heavy. Many antifederalists found the President suspiciously similar to a
king, and the Senate, a House of Lords.16 Elitist, too, was the new House
of Representatives." With seats elected every two years rather than annu-
ally, as had been the long practice of state legislatures, it seemed far re-
moved from the will of the people as well."
Antifederalists also attempted to downplay the supposed crisis of the
Articles, maintaining that the Confederation could solve the nation's ex-
isting problems." The anonymous "Letters of the Federal Farmer," fa-
mously argued: "It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a
measure, to tell us, now is the crisis-now is the crucial moment which
must be seized, or all will be lost."2 0 Far better, antifederalists reasoned, to
avoid a rush into a new government which could easily usurp their individ-
ual liberties. Unlike a central authority, state governments were kept
under close control by their constituents, thereby posing less risk to per-
sonal freedoms.2 1 The absence, too, of a bill of rights in the new Constitu-
tion became one of the antifederalists' chief arguments against the new
Constitution; today, it is perhaps their most enduring legacy.2 2
IV. BICAMERALISM
In Federalist No. 39, Madison stated, "The House of Representatives
will derive its powers from the people of America. . . . The Senate, on the
other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and co-equal
societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the
Senate."23
A. A House for the People and a Senate for the States
In the midst of redesigning the government, the founders at the Phila-
delphia Convention were particularly concerned with the legislative
branch. Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia submitted to the Con-
vention the "Virginia Plan," a structural scheme proposing separate execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches under a strong federal government.2 4
Legislative power would vest in a bicameral Congress.2 5 The lower house,
seated based on population, would be chosen by a popular vote; the upper
15. Id. at 111.
16. Id. at 112.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 111.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 112.
22. Id.
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chamber would then be elected by the lower house through nominations
from state legislatures. 26
Fearing discrimination against smaller states in Randolph's system of
population-based representation, delegate William Patterson countered
with his "New Jersey Plan."27 Keeping the existing unicameral structure of
Congress, Patterson allowed each state one vote. 28 Notably, however, the
new Congress would have the power to impose taxes and regulate com-
merce-a critical omission of the Articles of Confederation.2 9
Debate between the plans proved divisive, with population-based rep-
resentation centering as the point of contention. Larger states generally
supported the Virginia Plan, while smaller states opposed Randolph's sys-
tem altogether.3 0 Ultimately, Connecticut's Roger Sherman would find the
"Great Compromise."3" Sherman proposed a bicameral legislature in
which a House of Representatives would be apportioned according to pop-
ulation.32 A Senate would allow each state only two votes.3 3 Though the
plan became the structure we recognize today, some delegates-even
James Madison-would never be fully satisfied with the scheme, finding
equal state representation in the new Senate fundamentally
undemocratic. 34
Ultimately, the House of Representatives was designed to be very
close to the people. The terms of Representatives are, of course, two years,
and the entire House is subject to election each election cycle. The result
of this arrangement is that as changing political winds blow across
America, the House will rapidly reflect those changes. Such was the case in
2010.
The Senate is configured differently. Senators serve six-year terms.
During the first century of our republic, Senators were elected by the vari-
ous state Legislatures rather than directly by the people. Now, only one-
third of the Senate is subject to election each election cycle. So, the chang-
ing political winds must blow longer and stronger to affect a change in the
Senate.
B. Gridlocks
In Federalist No. 10, Madison attempted to assuage these fears of gov-
ernment tyranny. What the antifederalists bemoaned, Madison crafted to
his political advantage. Rather than insulating the new federal government
26. Id.
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from the will of the people, Madison insisted that the large size of the coun-
try would instead serve to make it more responsive to its diverse citizens."
Interplay among the competing factions would make it impossible for any
single interest to create a majority and seize tyrannical control. 6 "Extend
the sphere," he argued, "and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."37 Open competi-
tion would force the majority to recognize the minority to gain their sup-
port; the Constitutional republic would only be strengthened by the need
for adjustment and compromise.38 Here, perhaps, lies Madison's legacy-
although Congressional gridlock may appear senseless, "give-and-take" is
inherent in the very ideals of democracy. The vigorous debate of the cur-
rent Congress is the fulfillment of his vision.
V. CONCLUSION
Each Congress, over 10,000 bills are introduced. Of those, fewer than
500 are signed into law. As ideas are considered, debated, rejected, re-
vised, or advanced, we often find the legislative process has ground to a
halt. It appears this gridlock was exactly what Madison foresaw when he
crafted two very different bodies for the legislative branch.
The divided Congress may not be pretty to watch, and it is certainly
frustrating to be a participant in such gridlock, but it is the Constitution at
work.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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